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Abstract
A simple integrated assessment framework that gives rules for the optimal carbon price,
transition to the carbon-free era and stranded carbon assets is presented, which highlights the
ethical, economic, geophysical and political drivers of optimal climate policy. For the ethics
we discuss the role of intergenerational inequality aversion and the discount rate, where we
show the importance of lower discount rates for appraisal of longer run benefit and of policy
makers using lower discount rates than private agents. The economics depends on the costs
and rates of technical progress in production of fossil fuel, its substitute renewable energies
and sequestration. The geophysics depends on the permanent and transient components of
atmospheric carbon and the relatively fast temperature response, and we allow for positive
feedbacks. The politics stems from international free-rider problems in absence of a global
climate deal. We show how results change if different assumptions are made about each of
the drivers of climate policy. Our main objective is to offer an easy back-on-the-envelope
analysis, which can be used for teaching and communication with policy makers.
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1 Introduction
Our aim is to present a back-on-the-envelope integrated assessment framework that can be
used to derive optimal climate policies in a transparent and intuitive way. Climate policy has
to deal with several intertemporal, geophysical, and interregional aspects.
To discuss these issues, we use a framework consisting of an economic part (to describe
the use of fossil fuel use and its substitute renewable energy, carbon sequestration with
trend growth and sector-specific rates of technical progress, global damages to economic
production) and a climate part (to describe the dynamics of atmospheric carbon and global
mean temperature). This framework allows us to derive welfare-maximising climate policies
as simples rules for the optimal carbon price (equal to the social cost of carbon), the rate at
which renewable energies are substituted for fossil fuel, the fraction of fossil that is abated by
carbon capture and sequestration (CCS), the optimal timing of the transition to the carbon-free
era, the maximum cumulative emissions (or the carbon budget for short) and the maximum
warming level, and the amount of fossil fuel locked up forever in the crust of the earth. The
geophysical, ethical and economic drivers of climate policy can thus clearly be identified.
We highlight various features. Regarding the ethics of climate policy, we allow discount
rates to decline with the horizon at which costs and benefits are evaluated. Since the costs
of global warming occur many decades or even centuries into the future, this has important
implications for policy. This feature is known as hyperbolic discounting and has been put
forward by Laibson (1997). Following von Below (2012), Schmitt (2014), Belfiori (2017),
and Barrage (2018) we also allow policy makers to have a lower ethical discount rate than the
market. Both these features allow us to take a stance between the low discount rate used by
Stern (2007) and the high discount rate used by Nordhaus (2008): policy makers use lower
discount rates for long-run than for short-run appraisal of costs and benefits and may be
more farsighted than the market. Both features generally lead to time inconsistency. Given
simplifying assumptions, problems of commitment do not arise in our model.1 Regarding
the geophysical drivers of climate policy, apart from our benchmark of simple linear carbon
and temperature dynamics used by atmospheric physicists (e.g., Joos et al. 2013; Allen 2016;
Aengenheyster et al. 2018) and economists (e.g., Hassler and Krusell 2012; Golosov et al.
2014; van den Bijgaart et al. 2016; Rezai and van der Ploeg 2016; Gerlagh and Liski 2018),
we also allow for a model of carbon dynamics with the positive feedback loop that get
unleashed as the capacity of the oceans to absorb carbon diminishes (Millar et al. 2017).
Finally, regarding the political drivers of climate policy, we extend our simple rules to allow
for non-cooperative decision making to illustrate the point of international free riding and
the less ambitious climate policies that result from this (Barrett 2003). This addresses the
problem of free riding and is relevant as long as there are no international climate deals
with appropriate international transfers to ensure that the global carbon price indeed gets
implemented throughout the world economy.
Our objective is not to present any novel theoretical results, but to present a simple frame-
work that is consistent with a large and sometimes hard to comprehend integrated assessment
literature. We have used our framework for undergraduate and graduate teaching and in dis-
cussions with policy makers and interested lay persons. We have found it useful to highlight
1 We refer to the papers of Gerlagh and Liski (2018) and Iverson and Karp (2018) for time-consistent (techni-
cally subgame-perfect Markov equilibrium) solutions to the difficult problem of deriving welfare-maximising
climate policies under quasi-hyperbolic discounting in general equilibrium models with capital formation. See
also Fujii and Karp (2008).
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the drivers on climate policy and to illustrate various assumptions regarding the ethics, eco-
nomics, geophysics and politics underlying climate policy.2
Our contribution ties in with the emerging literature on simple and robust rules for the
optimal carbon price (e.g., Nordhaus 1991; Golosov et al. 2014; Rezai and van der Ploeg
2016; van den Bijgaart et al. 2016; Allen 2016; Dietz and Venmans 2018; van der Ploeg 2018;
van den Bremer and van der Ploeg 2018). We also offer simple rules for the optimal transition
time to the carbon-free era and the amount of locked up fossil fuel. These simple rules take
advantage of the much faster convergence of Ramsey economic growth dynamics than that
of the carbon cycle, thus greatly simplifying the complexity of the underlying system. The
resulting rules are easy to understand, calculate, explain, and communicate. Furthermore,
being simple feedback rules, they appear robust to different model specifications as they
perform well in a wide variety of integrated assessment models (Rezai and van der Ploeg
2016; van den Bijgaart et al. 2016; Barrage 2014).
A multitude of very large and detailed Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) of the
economy and the climate are able to generate numerical simulations of the optimal global
price of carbon, the implied optimal substitution rates of renewable energies for fossil fuel,
and the optimal sequestration rates. Although such IAMs give careful suggestions for climate
policies, the key determinants of these are difficult to understand. Furthermore, it has been
argued that in providing exact numbers they appear more precise than the underlying science
would permit and misrepresent the deep uncertainties surrounding global warming damages
and the social cost of carbon (e.g., Pindyck 2013; Wagner and Weitzman 2015; Stern 2016).
We therefore prefer a clear and transparent approach in which all the drivers of climate policy
are immediately apparent. To our benefit, recent insights in atmospheric science suggest that
global warming is well explained by cumulative carbon emissions rather than the stock of
carbon in the atmosphere (e.g., Allen 2016), even though large-scale IAMs have sophisticated
and high-dimensional models to describe the carbon cycle and temperature responses to
emission impulses.
Our back-on-the-envelope IAM is adapted from the most widely-used IAM, i.e., DICE
(Dynamic integrated model of climate and the economy; Nordhaus 2008, 2014). In this
IAM economic activity requires energy in production which in turn is generated using a
continuum of technologies and energy sources. The energy mix with the lowest unit costs
use fossil energy use only and have the largest amount of carbon emission per unit of energy.
As more renewable energies are substituted for fossil fuel, the cost per unit of energy becomes
more expensive whilst the carbon emissions per unit of energy fall. This substitution is driven
by a spectrum of carbon-free technologies, ranging from energy-saving to renewable energy
generation in combination with gas-fired power plants. The most expensive fuel mix is fully
carbon-free and is referred to as the “backstop” technology. Given our current technological
knowledge, one can think of this backstop as CCS which takes carbon directly out of the
atmosphere when using fossil fuel and then stores it underground as the most carbon-persistent
production processes (such as metallurgical ones or air travel) cannot be decarbonised at
current capabilities. We thus make explicit the difference between substitution of less carbon-
intensive fuel in the energy mix3 and carbon capture and sequestration. This distinction is
2 An Excel sheet is available for those who wish to examine the effect of varying assumptions and parameters
values on optimal climate policies.
3 In contrast, one can examine breakthrough renewable energy which comes in as a perfect substitute for fossil
fuel only once it has gained a cost advantage and signals the abrupt end of the carbon era (e.g., Rezai and van
der Ploeg 2016). Somewhat unrealistically, the only lever of climate policy was thus the end of the carbon era
(not the emission ratio) and thus cumulative emissions and peak warming. However, partial carbon reduction
where mitigation and abatement are used alongside each other is clearly more realistic, so this together with
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important as both instruments differ in their long-term effects: renewable energy create a
legacy of unused fossil fuel deposits which can become economically lucrative if future
policy becomes less ambitious while CCS bear the risk of leakage (Belfiori and Iverson
2018).
Like DICE, our benchmark IAM computes cumulative carbon use and does not speak
to the issue of stranded carbon assets directly. However, we include an extension where the
cost of extracting fossil fuel rises as less reserves are left in situ, which allows the economic
analysis of stranded carbon assets too. We also give extensions to allow for research and
development in renewable energy production and for CCS becoming more expensive as
available CO2 reservoirs are being used up.4
We thus present a back-of-the-envelope IAM and derive simple rules for the optimal carbon
price and climate policies. Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3 derives our simple rule
for the optimal price of carbon and the optimal rates of substituting renewable energies for
fossil fuel and of CCS. Section 4 discusses the timing of energy transitions, carbon budgets,
and peak warming for different policy regimes arising under the optimal climate policy.
Section 5 presents the optimal climate policies for our benchmark calibration. Sections 6, 7,
8 and 9 discuss the sensitivity of optimal climate policies to different assumptions regarding
the ethical, economic, geophysical and political drivers of climate policies, respectively. In
particular, we allow for hyperbolic discounting and positive feedbacks resulting from capacity
for absorbing CO2 diminishing as the oceans heat up. Section 10 concludes.
2 A Back-of-the-Envelope Integrated Assessment Model
Most IAMs simultaneously model the economic dynamics of the productive capabilities and
the evolution of the climate. Following earlier work on simple rules (e.g., Nordhaus 1991;
Golosov et al. 2014; Rezai and van der Ploeg 2016; van den Bijgaart et al. 2016; Allen
2016; Dietz and Venmans 2018; van der Ploeg 2018; van den Bremer and van der Ploeg
2018), we suppose that the dynamics of economic growth converge much faster than that
of the carbon cycle and temperature dynamics. Given this and the long horizons involved in
assessing optimal climate policy, we abstract from capital formation and assume for purposes
of calculating the social cost of carbon that the economy has converged to its balanced growth
path where aggregate global output of goods and services before climate damages, denoted
by Y , and aggregate global consumption, denoted by C, are both growing at the exogenous
rate of economic growth, g.
Following DICE, we suppose that production of Yt at time t requires energy in a fixed and
declining proportion, so that global aggregate energy use is γ0e−rγ t Yt , where γ0 is the initial
energy intensity and rγ is the rate at which the energy intensity declines over time. Energy is
composed of both carbon-based sources (fossil fuel) and carbon-free sources (e.g., solar or
wind). We denote by mt the endogenous share of carbon-free sources in the energy mix and
by at the endogenous fraction of emissions that is captured and stored using CCS and other
sequestration technologies at time t. We suppose that energy is measured in Giga tonnes of
Footnote 3 continued
the optimal transition times for the various energy phases is what we will introduce in an easy-to-understand,
back-of-the-envelope IAM.
4 While early contributions focused the effect of climate policy on stranded natural assets, i.e., the amount of
fossil fuel to be abandoned in situ (McGlade and Ekins 2015; van der Ploeg and Rezai 2017), recent studies
include effects of policy on stranded physical and financial assets and nation states (Manley et al. 2017;
Baldwin et al. 2018; van der Ploeg and Rezai 2018). See also Karp and Rezai (2018) effects on asset prices.
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carbon (GtC) or its equivalent. Hence, residual carbon emissions entering the atmosphere
from aggregate production at time t amount to (1 − at )(1 − mt )γ0e−rγ t Yt .
The cost of the energy mix rises with the share of carbon-free renewable energies mt .
We suppose that the cost of one unit of energy declines at the relative rate of technical
progress in using renewable energy rather than fossil fuel, denoted by rR , thus capturing the
potential for future cost reductions as carbon-free technologies mature. We let this cost be
mt H0 + θ−1m m
θm
t e
−rR t H1 with θm > 1, H0 ≥ 0 and H1 > 0. Similarly, we suppose that
the cost of sequestrating one unit of emissions is θ−1a a
θa
t e
−rAt A1 with θa > 1 and A1 > 0,
where the relative rate of technical progress in sequestration is denoted by rA and captures
the potential for future cost reductions as sequestration technologies mature. We let the cost
of generating 1 GtC of fossil fuel be G(t)  G0e−rF t , where G0 ≥ 0 denotes the initial cost
and rF is the rate of technical progress in producing fossil fuel (e.g., due to the invention of
horizontal drilling in fracking).5 Our formulation is general and allows us to disentangle the
dynamics of energy use per fuel type and energy efficiency.
We denote the price of carbon emissions by Pt , so that the total costs of the energy
mix per unit of output are Zt ≡
[
mt H0 + θ−1m m
θm
t e
−rR t H1 + θ−1a a
θa
t e
−rAt A1(1 − mt ) +
G0e−rF t (1 − mt ) + Pt (1 − at )(1 − mt )
]
γ0e−rγ t . Minimising this cost we get the upward-
sloping schedules for the proportion of the energy mix that consists of renewable energy
(also known as the mitigation rate) mt and the share of emissions that is sequestrated (also
known as the abatement rate) at :
mt 
(
G0e−rF t + 1θa a
θa
t e
−rAt A1 + (1 − at )Pt − H0
H1e−rR t
)εm
, 0 ≤ mt ≤ 1, (1)
at 
(
erAt Pt/A1
)εa
, 0 ≤ at ≤ 1, (2)
where εi  1/(θi − 1) > 0 for i  m, a denote price elasticities.6 A higher carbon price
Pt thus leads to both more substitution of renewable energy in the energy mix and to more
sequestration of carbon emissions. More technical progress in renewable energies (higher
rR) leads to a faster substitution of renewable energies for fossil fuel but does not affect
sequestration. The rate of sequestration is only affected by its own technology parameters
and increases as its cost falls (higher rA and lower A1). Higher cost of fossil fuel and lower
cost of renewable energies (higher G0 and lower H0 and H1) boost the share of energy mix
that consists of carbon-free energies. Equation (1) imply that mt  m(t , Pt ) and at  a(t ,
Pt ), and thus we can express minimal unit cost as Zt  Z (t , Pt ). The share of carbon-free
sources in the energy mix, the fraction of emissions that are sequestrated and the minimal
unit energy cost thus depend on the carbon price and time (via the various rates of technical
progress). In the absence of carbon pricing, no emissions are sequestered (at  0) while
renewable energies are still utilised to the point where their marginal cost equals that of fossil
energy, reflecting current economic circumstances. In pushing up the cost of polluting energy
sources, carbon pricing increases the share of renewables in energy generation and makes
sequestration profitable.
The optimal pricing of carbon depends on the severity and duration of climate damage
caused by one unit of carbon. We assume that, once carbon is emitted into the atmosphere, it
5 Energy modelling is more reduced in DICE. With H0  G0  0 our energy sector is equivalent to that of
DICE. By including the unit cost component H0 and G0 we are able to capture cost innovations such as the
shale gas revolution which alter the energy mix and shift climate policy.
6 Nordhaus (2013) sets θm = 2.8 in which case the carbon price elasticity of mitigation is εm = 0.55. DICE
models the cost of renewable energy in excess of fossil energy, assuming implicitly a fixed baseline (i.e. fossil)
energy share of GDP. We account for the cost of energy generation explicitly.
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evolves according to a two-box carbon cycle. The stock of atmospheric carbon Et ≡ E Pt + ETt
consists of a permanent part, which retains a share 0 < β0 < 1 of carbon emissions. A
transient part of atmospheric carbon, which retains a share 1 − β0 of carbon emissions,
decays at the rate β1 > 0. We suppose that there is an average lag Tlag before global mean
temperature responds to an increase in the stock of atmospheric carbon. We capture this
by letting the aggregate flow damage from global warming per unit of output be given by
d E˜t , where E˜t denotes the delayed carbon stock (i.e., after temperature has responded to
changes in the atmospheric carbon). We can thus summarise our model of the dynamics of
atmospheric carbon and temperature by
E˙ Pt  β0[1 − a(t , Pt )][1 − m(t , Pt )]γ0e−rγ t Yt ,
E˙Tt  (1 − β0)[1 − a(t , Pt )][1 − m(t , Pt )]γ0e−rγ t Yt − β1 ETt ,
˙˜Et  (E Pt + ETt − E˜t )/T lag. (3)
Aggregate global consumption Ct is what is left of aggregate global production after
subtracting global warming damages and energy costs. If the revenue from carbon taxes (or
from selling carbon emission permits) are rebated to the private sector, it is
Ct 
[
1 − d E˜t − Z (t , Pt ) + Pt ∂ Z (t , Pt )/∂ Pt
]
Yt as ∂ Z (t , Pt )/∂ Pt  (1 − at (1 − mt )γ0e−rγ t Yt .
(4)
Climate policy maximises global welfare corresponding to the present discount value of
utilities derived from the stream of present and future consumption levels,
Ω ≡
∫ ∞
0
U (Ct )e−RT I×t dt with U (Ct )  C
1−I I A
t
1 − I I A , (5)
subject to the dynamics of the climate system (3), where RTI > 0 denotes the constant rate of
time impatience and the utility function is iso-elastic with a constant coefficient of relative
intergenerational inequality aversion, IIA. The IIA captures how little current generations are
prepared to sacrifice current consumption to limit future global warming.7 Upon substitution
of aggregate consumption from (3) and Yt  Y0e−gt for trend aggregate world production,
we get
Ω 
∫ ∞
0
⎛
⎝
[
1 − d E˜t − Z (t , Pt )
]
Y0
1 − I I A
⎞
⎠
I I A
e−Rt dt  with R ≡ RT I + I I A × g, (5′)
where R denotes the (long-run) social discount rate (and corresponds to the one from the
Keynes-Ramsey rule). The social discount rate is high if the rate of time impatience is high,
future generations are richer than current ones (provided IIA > 1), and intergenerational
inequality aversion is high (provided g > 0). The choice of the social discount rate has been
subject to much debate. We have here a constant social discount rate, but will generalise our
findings to non-constant discount rates in Sect. 6 where we combine relatively high short run
discount rates suggested by Nordhaus (2008) with near-zero rates for the RTI as argued in
the Stern Review.
Output grows at constant trend rate of growth g. What matters for optimal (climate) policy
is the social discount rate corrected for growth denoted by
7 For the iso-elastic utility function, it equals both the coefficient of relative risk aversion and the inverse of
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
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SDR  R − g  RT I + (I I A − 1) × g. (6)
This growth-corrected discount rate takes into account the trade-off between greater mate-
rial wealth when deciding how much climate mitigation to do. If intergenerational inequality
aversion is high (IIA > 1), higher income growth pushes up the SDR and future damages are
taken into account (relatively) less. With logarithmic utility (IIA  1), the SDR is simply
the RTI . When intergenerational inequality aversion is low (IIA < 1), current generations are
willing to sacrifice their own consumption even as future generations get richer.
3 Optimal Policies for Making the EnergyMix Carbon-Free
We can now conduct the cost-benefit analysis of choosing between fossil and renewable
energy sources and the amount of emissions to be sequestered, having defined preferences,
endowments, and technology. The following result presents our simple rules for the optimal
carbon price, Pt , the optimal share of carbon-free sources in the energy mix, mt (the mitigation
rate), and the fraction of emissions that are sequestrated, at (the abatement rate) for our back-
on-the-envelope IAM.
Result 1: The optimal carbon price is
Pt ∼ τY0egt with τ 
(
β0
SDR
+
1 − β0
SDR + β1
)(
1
1 + SDR × T lag
)
d , (7)
where the growth-corrected social discount rate SDR is (6). Given (7), the fraction of fossil
fuel use that is abated and the share of renewable energies in total energy follow from (1)
and (2).
Proof see “Appendix 1”.
Expression (1) for our simple rule for the optimal price of carbon does not depend on the
fossil fuel intensity of the economy, because along the balanced growth path the consumption
share is fixed. The optimal carbon price is proportional to GDP and hence grows at rate g.
The optimal carbon price is depressed by the lag between changes in temperature and in the
stock of atmospheric carbon (Rezai and van der Ploeg 2016; van den Bijgaart et al. 2016).
If the temperature lag is absent, (7) boils down to the simple rule derived in Golosov et al.
(2014).8 The carbon price also depends on other geophysical factors. It increases in the share
of emissions that stay permanently in the atmosphere (higher β0) and increases if the rate of
decay of atmospheric carbon drops (lower β1). The latter might occur if global warming has
depressed the absorption capacity of the oceans and other carbon sinks. The ethical drivers
of the carbon price can be seen from the SDR. If society is relatively impatient (high RTI) and
shows little willingness to sacrifice current consumption to curb future global warming (high
IIA), the SDR is high and thus carbon pricing is unambitious. Finally, the economic drivers
of the carbon price are twofold. Higher economic costs of global warming resulting from a
higher flow damage coefficient (higher d) or higher current GDP give rise to a higher price
of carbon. With a higher trend rate of economic growth, future damages (being proportional
to future GDP) will be higher and thus the present discounted value of these damages and
the optimal carbon price will be higher too. Furthermore, if the rate of economic growth is
8 The carbon price in Golosov et al. (2014) is the exact social cost of carbon in a model with endogenous
manmade capital under the restrictions of logarithmic utility, full depreciation of manmade capital, exponential
climate damage, and zero fossil fuel extraction costs.
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high and thus future generations are relatively richer than the current generation, there is
less willingness among the current generation to undertake ambitious climate policies (high
I I A × g and thus a high SDR from (6)). This latter effect is captured by the negative effect
of g on the growth-corrected SDR which dominates if growth IIA > 1.
These geophysical, ethical, and economic drivers of the optimal carbon price are also the
drivers of the fraction of the energy mix that is clean and the fraction of carbon emissions
that are sequestrated as these increase in the carbon price can be seen from (1) and (2),
respectively. As discussed in Sect. 2, (1) and (2) also indicate that substitution for renewable
energies and sequestration also increase if their marginal costs fall due to technical progress.
4 Policy Regimes, Transition Times and Carbon Budgets
The emissions of carbon ends either by ongoing substitution of all fossil fuel for renewable
energies or by full sequestration (i.e., when either mt or at reaches 100%). Depending on
which one stops the fossil era, we can identify the corresponding transition times and carbon
budgets. For example, if the cost of using carbon-based energy (including the carbon tax) is
greater than the cost of the carbon-free alternative, i.e.G0 + τY0 > H0 + H1, full mitigation
is optimal from the start and mt  1, ∀t ≥ 0. No sequestration is necessary and the carbon
budget and transition time are irrelevant. In fact, we suppose the more realistic case where
carbon-free technologies are not competitive today or in the near future, i.e.,G0 + τY0 <
H0 + H1. This implies positive emissions with m0 < 1 and mt rising monotonically over
time, given that renewable energy becomes competitive over time relative to their carbon-
based alternatives. In this scenario it is optimal to start with a phase where fossil fuel is used
alongside renewable energies. If A1 < τ Y0, only part of these fossil fuel emissions are
abated initially. In this case two regimes, with partial and complete sequestration of carbon
emissions, are possible, before renewables take over fully in the third regime.
We first focus on the regime with partial sequestration, so at the time of transition to the
carbon-free era, T , all energy consists of renewables, i.e. mt  1 for all t ≥ T , and not all
emissions from burning fossil fuel are fully sequestrated yet, i.e., at < 1 for all t < T . There
is no need for sequestration in the carbon-free era, so that at  0 for all t ≥ T . The following
result summarises such a regime with partial sequestration.
Result 2 (partial sequestration): If fossil fuel is completely removed from the energy mix
before all emissions are fully sequestrated, i.e. mt = 1 for t ≥ T and at < 1 for t < T, the
optimal carbon price, the share of renewable energies in total energy, and the fraction of
carbon emissions that are sequestrated follow from (7), (1) and (2), respectively. Transition
to the carbon-free era occurs once the cost of carbon-based energy, including the carbon
price, has risen to just that of renewable energies or, equivalent, when mT  1 has reached
for some T. The optimal carbon budget corresponds to cumulative carbon emissions, B ∫ T
0 (1 − at )(1 − mt )γ0Y0e(g−rγ )t dt .
“Appendix 1” contains the formal statement and derivation of Result 3.9
The relevant arbitrage conditions for a regime where full mitigation occurs before full
sequestration are mT 
[
(G0e−rF T +θ−1a a
θa
T e
−rAT A1+(1−aT )PT −H0)/
(
H1e−rR T
)]εm  1
and aT 
(
erAT PT /A1
)εa
< 1. Climate policy and technology jointly determine whether
this regime occurs. We assume that there is sufficient technical change in renewable energy
9 Our IAM with partial sequestration is solved by running Eqs. (1)–(2) with (7) forward in time until there is
a time t = T at which mt hits 1 from below and aT < 1. The optimal cumulative carbon emissions (the carbon
budget) then simply follow from cumulative use.
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production, relative to cost reductions in dirty energy, so that the mitigation ratio rises with
time until it reaches one and the switch to the carbon-free era takes place. Technological
change and a carbon price rising at the rate of economic growth drive this transition. If there
is no directed technical change whatsoever and no economic growth, the share of renewables
in the energy mix is constant, mt 
(
G0+P0(1−a)−H0
H1
)εm
, ∀t ≥ 0, and the fraction of carbon
emissions that is sequestrated is constant too, at 
(
P0
A1
)εa
, ∀t ≥ 0, so there will never be
a switch to the carbon-free era. Hence, cumulative emissions rise forever and climate policy
has become impotent. Carbon emissions cause global warming but the ensuing economic
damages are evaluated as too low to warrant a more aggressive carbon tax.
The second regime occurs if substitution for renewable energies occurs at a too low
pace relative to the pace at which sequestration takes place in which case it is optimal to
sequestrate all carbon emissions at time T′ before all fossil in the energy mix is fully replaced
by renewables at time T > T′, with T ′  1
rA+g ln
(
A1
τY0
)
and T from G0e−rF T + 1θa A1e
−rAT 
H0 + H1e−rR T . This regime is relevant if the cost of sequestration is low and technical
change in sequestration is high, both relative to the cost of switching to renewable energies.
For this regime there are three distinct potential phases: phase 1 where fossil fuel is partially
sequestrated and used alongside renewable energies during the period 0 ≤ t < T′, phase 2
where fully sequestrated fossil fuel is used alongside renewable energies during the period T′
≤ t < T , and possibly a phase 3 where only renewable energies are used and sequestration is no
longer necessary for the period t ≥ T . If technical change in the development of carbon-free
alternatives is slow, phase 2 lasts longer and features a temporarily falling share of renewable
in the energy mix, mt .
Result 3 (full sequestration): If full sequestration takes place before all fossil fuel is removed
from the energy mix, at = 1, for T′ ≤ t < T, the optimal carbon price and share of renewable
energy in the energy mix are given by (7) and (1). The fraction of emissions that are seques-
trated in phase 1 follows from (2) before reaching the value of 1 in phase 2 at time T′. The
transition time to phase 3, the carbon-free era, T, occurs once the cost of fully sequestrated
carbon-based energies including the carbon price has risen to just the cost of renewable
energies. The carbon budget, B, equals cumulative use in phase 1, from time 0 to T′.
“Appendix 1” contains the formal statement and derivation of Result 3.10
Equations (1)–(2) with (6) and (7) define our back-of-the-envelope IAM. Climate policies
in the form of substituting renewables in the energy mix and sequestration determine the
transition time, T , at which the carbon era comes to an end, and the carbon budget B, by
pricing carbon appropriately. From time T onwards, fossil fuel use is zero and all energy
is carbon-free. Knowing the carbon budget, we can determine peak global warming (PW )
using the relation PW  Temp0 + TCRE × B (cf., Allen 2016), where TCRE is the transient
climate response and Temp0 a constant.
Pricing carbon makes sequestration profitable (abatement rate at positive) and increases
the share of mitigation, thereby shortening the transition time and the carbon budget. A higher
carbon price (e.g. because of a higher damage coefficient for global warming d which pushes
up the whole carbon price trajectory) increases the share of renewable energies in total energy,
10 Our IAM with full sequestration is solved by running Eqs. (1) and (2) using (7) for the optimal carbon
price forwards in time until there is a time t = T′ at which at hits 1 from below and mT′ < 1. There follows an
intermediate phase with fossil fuel with full abatement and renewable energy used together from T′ to T until
mT hits 1 from below. The optimal carbon budget corresponds to cumulative carbon emissions from time 0 to
T′.
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increases the fraction of carbon emissions that is abated, and brings forward the transition to
the carbon-free era. This cuts the optimal carbon budget and peak global warming. Generally,
the effectiveness of carbon pricing depends on technological possibilities and prospects. If the
cost of renewable energy is falling fast, i.e. large rR, carbon pricing only adds little effect to the
technologically driven transition to sustainability. Innovations like horizontal drilling which
lead to the shale gas revolution can be captured as a big negative shock to G0. Although the
carbon price is unaffected, the transition to the carbon free era is postponed as it is profitable
to continue with fossil fuel for longer. Furthermore, the ratio of renewable energy in total
energy drops instantaneously and as a consequence the optimal carbon budget and peak
global warming are higher. A breakthrough in renewable energy production captured by a
negative shock to H0 has the opposite effects. A strong enough breakthrough in sequestration
technology also tilts the policy mix toward abatement away from mitigation, permitting
a regime with 100% abatement (see Sect. 7.3). If technical change in renewables, rR, is
strong compared with that in fossil fuel extraction, rF , and sequestration, rA, carbon-free
technologies eventually gets cheap enough to replace fossil fuel cum sequestration, so that
the transition time T is finite. If technical change in renewable energies is sufficiently rapid,
sequestration only plays an important transitional role in the intermediate phase before the
economy abandons fossil fuel altogether.
Without climate policy, i.e. Pt  0, technological progress and cost-cutting in carbon-free
technologies are still able to drive carbon emissions to zero. The introduction of a carbon
price shortens this transition period. The carbon budget is small for a high and rapidly rising
extraction cost of fossil fuel and social cost of carbon, and a low and rapidly falling cost of
renewable energy and abatement.
5 Optimal Climate Policies: Benchmark Calibration
Table 1 gives the ethical, economic and geophysical assumptions underlying the benchmark
calibration of our back-of-the-envelope IAM. Unless stated otherwise, this follows the DICE
and RICE models (Nordhaus 2010, 2015) for the ethical parameters and economic growth,
cost and technological parameters, and baseline scenarios (see “Appendix 3” for more details).
As far as the ethics is concerned, time impatience is 1.5% per year and the coefficient of
relative intergenerational inequality aversion, IIA, is 1.45. Given a trend rate of economic
growth of 2% per year, the Keynes-Ramey rule implies an interest rate of 4.4% per year and
thus the growth-corrected social discount rate, SDR, is 2.4% per year.
For the economics, energy use is 0.14 Giga tons of carbon per trillion dollars of world
GDP (initially $73T) amounting to 10 GtC of emissions. The initial cost of fossil fuel is 7%
of GDP or $515/tC, and we assume cost rises at 0.1% per year to capture higher costs as less
fossil fuel reserves remain. The unit cost of fossil fuel is constant (resulting in a constant
energy share in the absence of climate policy) while the unit cost of renewable increases as
their share in the energy mix rises. The corresponding price elasticity is 0.55 and the rate
of technical progress in carbon-free energy is 1.25% per year. Sequestration is not captured
explicitly in the DICE model. We assume that the cost of sequestration is initially quite high,
namely 20% of GDP (or $2936/tC), and declines at the same rate of technical progress as
renewables (at a rate of 1.25% per year). We set the cost of global warming at 1.9% of world
GDP (measured in trillions of dollars) for every trillion ton of carbon.11
11 Golosov et al. (2014) use a higher figure of 2.379% to allow for a small risk (6.8%) of a 30% catastrophic
drop in world GDP at 6 °C. If we used this higher figure, all carbon prices would be 25% higher.
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Table 1 Benchmark calibration
Ethical
Rate of time impatience for exponential discounting: RTI = 1.5% per year
Intergenerational inequality aversion and risk aversion: IIA = 1.45
Growth-corrected social discount rate: SDR = 2.4% per year
Economic
World economy: GDP0 = 73 T$, g = 2% per year
Energy use per unit of world GDP: γ = 0.14 GtC/T$, rγ = 0% per year
Fossil fuel cost: G0 = 515 $/tC, rE = − 0.1% per year
Renewable energy cost: H0 = 515 $/tC, H1 = 1150 $/tC, θm = 2.8, εm = 0.55, rR = 1.25% per year
Sequestration (CCS) cost: A1 = 2936 $/tC, θa = 2 so εa = 1, rA = 1.25% per year
Flow damage as fraction of world GDP: d = 0.019 $/tC
Geophysical
Coefficients permanent & transient box of carbon cycle: β0 = 0.2, β1 = 0.0023
Average lag between temperature/damages and carbon stock: Tlag = 10 years
Transient climate response to cumulative emissions: TCRE = 2 °C/TtC
We adopt the geophysics from the model of Golosov et al. (2014) and assume that 20%
of carbon emissions remain forever in the atmosphere and the remainder returns back to the
surface of the oceans and the earth at a speed of 0.23% per year. We add a mean lag of
10 years between the rise in temperature and the change in the stock of atmospheric carbon.
Following Allen (2016), we let the transient climate response to cumulative emissions be
2 °C per trillion tons of carbon.
Since the ethics and the costs and benefits of climate policies in the near and very distant
future are open for debate and to a much lesser extent the geophysics too, the assumptions
in Table 1 are to a certain extent subjective. Our framework, however, allows us to investi-
gate the effects of changing these assumptions on optimal climate policies in a transparent,
straightforward way (see Sects. 6–9).
Given our benchmark calibration in Table 1, the solid black and short-dashed blue lines
in Fig. 1 are the outcomes under the optimal climate policies and under business as usual
(BAU) where the carbon price is zero, respectively. Our simple rule for the optimal carbon
price starts at $44/tC (or $12/tCO2) and then grows in line with the trend rate of economic
growth at 2% per year—see the top panel. The black solid line in the bottom panel shows
that the mitigation rate starts at 16% and then rises to 100% in 86 years, growing on average
at 2% per year. Pricing carbon leads to 1.5% of the remaining fossil fuel emissions being
sequestrated initially (see the red dotted line in the bottom panel of Fig. 1). Following (2),
sequestration increases at a progress-adjusted growth rate of 3.25% per year. By the end of
the carbon ear, a total of 784 GtC have been emitted, inducing peak warming of 2.9 °C early
in the next century due to the 10-year average lag in the climate system.
Without a carbon price, cost reductions in the generation of renewable energy are the only
drivers of the energy transition. Fossil fuels are used more and for longer, with mt in the second
panel of Fig. 2 rising slowly towards full decarbonisation in the next century. Without the
carbon price stick, no sequestration efforts will be undertaken, increasing emissions further.
If no additional policy measures are imposed (such as fuel standards, renewable subsidies, a
moratorium on coal, etc.), BAU leads to cumulative emissions of 1778 GtC and peak warming
of 4.9 °C. Positive mitigation levels under BAU are solely driven by the gradual improvements
in the cost competitiveness of renewable energy. If the cost differential between dirty and
clean inputs were to remain constant, i.e. rR  rF  0, carbon-based technologies would
be used indefinitely, i.e., mt  0, under BAU.
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Fig. 1 Optimal climate policy under hyperbolic discounting. Key Under hyperbolic discounting without com-
mitment (green dashed-dotted lines) climate policy is more ambitious than under exponential discounting
(black lines), where less weight is placed on future generations’ welfare. Even in the absence of a carbon price
(blue short-dashed lines) fossil fuels are slowly phased out due to the advance of carbon-free technologies.
Carbon prices can be compared to the less plausible case of hyperbolic discounting with pre-commitment
(brown long-dashed lines). (Color figure online)
Despite its simplicity, our IAM compare well with the fully-fledged DICE-2013R model to
which we have calibrated our model parameters. In the absence of population growth, DICE
reports an initial carbon price of $48/tC and mitigation rate of 17%. The rates of growth of
the carbon price and mitigation are, however, significantly slower and cumulative emissions
higher due to DICE’s long temperature lag of more than 100 years. In our simulations we
have also verified that the approximation of a constant consumption share, used in our simple
rule (7), is reasonable for our chosen calibration. Along the policy paths shown in Fig. 1, this
ratio varies between 93% and 90% over time, since energy and damages constitutes only a
modest share of GDP along an optimal path where climate damages are limited.
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Fig. 2 Technological drivers of climate policies. Key Technological improvements in renewable energies have
a significant impact on the carbon budget and peak warming while reductions in the cost of sequestration
mostly affect the composition of emission reduction, phasing in sequestration more slowly while completely
switching over to renewables is delayed. (Color figure online)
6 Ethics: Low Discount Rates for the Long Term and Aﬄuence of Future
Generations
Here we discuss the question of discounting, first in Sect. 6.1 an extension of the benchmark
model to hyperbolic discounting and then briefly discuss ethical considerations in connection
with intergenerational inequality aversion and wealth of future generations in Sect. 6.2.
6.1 Hyperbolic DiscountingVersus Exponential Discounting
The rate of time impatience, RTI , represents the weight placed on future generations’ welfare
and crucially determines how ambitious climate policy is. Our welfare function (5) with
exponential discounting implies that RTI is constant. Given a constant rate of trend economic
growth, the growth-corrected social discount rate, SDR, is constant too (see Eq. (6)). A smaller
RTI lowers the SDR and increases the carbon price (7) and thus makes climate policy makes
more ambitious. Our purpose is to extend our analysis to hyperbolic discounting, which
nests our base calibration with exponential discounting and constant RTI as a special case.
Empirical and theoretical arguments support the declining long-term discount rates being
lower than short-term discount rates (e.g., Arrow et al. 2013, 2014). The presence of risk
or heterogeneous agents have been put forward as a compelling arguments for certainty-
equivalent rates that decline with long time horizons (e.g., Weitzman 1994, 2001; Gollier
and Zeckhauser 2005). Microeconomic studies on procrastination suggest that people tend
to delay beneficial but hard actions (Laibson 1997).12 Our motivation for using generalised
12 In a sample 74% of respondents choose fruit and 26% chocolate when they can have it next week, but
people choose 30% fruit and 70% chocolate when they get it today (Read and van Leeuwen 1998); in a
different example, 66% choose a low-brow and 34% high-brow video today but next week 37% a low-brow
and 63% high-brow video (Read et al.1999). So the self wants to be patient and delay gratification, but actions
indicate instant gratification. This is why plans to quit smoking, exercise or lose weight are not followed
through (Gruber and Koszegi 2003). People join gym for $75/month but only visit on average 4 times a month,
so average cost per visit is $19 instead of $10 on a PAYG basis which seems irrational (Della Vigna and
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hyperbolic discounting is that it allows us to use a high short-run discount rate, ρ, which
we associate with the more market-based rate of time preference, and a much lower or zero
long-run discount rate, which we associate with an ethical rate of time preference.13
The general class of hyperbolic discounting has discounting function Dt  (1 + ιt)− ρa ,
ι 
 0. For ι → 0, this simplifies to exponential discounting,Dt  e−ρt , which was used in
our benchmark welfare function (5). With ι  ρ, we get the case of hyperbolic discounting,
Dt  (1 + ρt)−1. The instantaneous discount rate at time t is defined as δt ≡ −D′t/Dt 
ρ/(1+ ιt) and equals ρ at time zero and then declines to zero as time goes to infinity. With this
type of discounting and in contrast to the benchmark case of exponential discounting, optimal
(climate) policies are generally time inconsistent. Hence, if policy makers re-optimise at some
future point of time and renege, they will choose different policies. We therefore distinguish
between optimal climate policies with commitment and those without commitment.
Result 4: With commitment and generalised hyperbolic discounting, the optimal carbon price
is
Pcommitmentt  d Y0
∫ ∞
t
(
1
1 + ι t
) ρ
ι
e−(I I A−1)gt
[
β0 + (1 − β0)e−β1 t
]
dt
 dYt
(
ι−1 + t
)
eg(I I A−1)(ι−1+t)
×
{
β0 Eρ/a
(
g(I I A − 1)(ι−1 + t)
)
+
1 − β0
1 − β1 × T lag e
β1
(
ι−1+t
)
Eρ/a
(
[g(I I A − 1) + β1](ι−1 + t)
)
−
(
β0 +
1 − β0
1 − β1 × T lag
)
eT lag
−1(ι−1+t
)
Eρ/a
([
g(I I A − 1) + T lag−1
]
(ι−1 + t)
)}
, (8)
where En(x) ≡
∫ ∞
1
e−x s
sn
ds is the generalised exponential integral function.
Proof See “Appendix 2”.
The initial optimal carbon price under hyperbolic discounting (8) is higher and rises at a
faster rate than the price under exponential discounting (7), since the discount rate falls with
longer time horizons. The optimal carbon price (8) assumes commitment to an announced
time path of future carbon prices. If the policy makers renege on predecessors’ plans and
re-optimise at some future date, the carbon price is lowered again (due to the relatively high
discount rate for short horizons) and rises monotonically as time progresses. In equilibrium,
the carbon price is recalculated in each period and current policymakers take this into account
when announcing their policies.
Result 5: The optimal carbon price under generalised hyperbolic discounting when policy
makers cannot commit to announced future time paths of carbon prices is
Footnote 12 continued
Malmendier, 2004). Similarly, people save less than their target saving (Bernheim, 1992; Choi et al., 2003;
Public Agenda, 1997; Angeletos et al., 2001).
13 Seminal applications of declining discount rates to climate change are Karp (2005), Fujii and Karp (2008),
Karp and Tsur (2011), Gollier (2012), Gerlagh and Liski (2018), and Karp and Iverson (2018).
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Table 2 Climate policy if future is discounted less heavily at longer horizons
Carbon price
P0
Sequestration
a0 (%)
Mitigation
m0 (%)
Carbon
budget B
(GtC)
End fossil
era (years)
Peak
warming
(°C)
Exponential
discounting
(DICE)
44 $/tC 1.5 16.1 784 86 2.9
Hyperbolic
discounting
(no commit-
ment)
92 $/tC 3.1 24.4 488 72 2.3
Hyperbolic
discounting
(with com-
mitment)
92 $/tC 3.1 24.4 436 68 2.2
Business as
usual
0 $/tC 0 0 1778 118 4.9
DICE 48 $/tC – 17 1171 110 3.3
Key With exponential discounting there is a constant discount rate of 1.5% per year. Hyperbolic discounting
starts with the same initial discount rate which then drops off over time to 0.1% per year in a century’s time. This
leads to a much more ambitious climate policy with higher carbon taxes, higher sequestration and mitigation
rates, lower carbon budgets and a quicker end of the fossil era. As a result, peak warming is less than with
exponential discounting and much less than under business as usual. If commitment to future climate policies
is feasible, carbon is initially taxed the same but then it grows at a faster rate so that climate policy is more
ambitious. The value of commitment is small as it lowers the carbon budget by mere 52 GtC and peak warming
by 0.1 °C. Under business as usual no carbon price is imposed and relative cost advances in renewable energy
are the sole driver of decarbonisation. Here, the carbon era ends in the 22nd century with an excessive carbon
budget and extreme levels of warming
Pno−commitmentt  (Yt/Y0)Pcommitment0 . (8′)
Proof “Appendix 2” shows that this corresponds to the feedback Nash equilibrium, which is
time consistent by construction and relevant when commitment is not feasible.
We thus see that the optimal carbon price without commitment (8′) follows a lower tra-
jectory than the carbon price with commitment (8) as discount rates are reset to their initial,
higher value in each period whereas they are allowed to decline if policy makers can commit.
As a result, carbon prices grow at a slower pace, namely at the rate of trend economic growth.
To illustrate how the assumption of generalised hyperbolic discounting affects climate
policy, we calibrate the one-year discount rate for appraisal today to the one used by Nordhaus
(2015), i.e. δ0  1.5% per year, and the one-year discount rate for in one century ahead to
the one used by the Stern Review, i.e. δ100  0.1%/year. From δt  ρ/(1 + ι t), this gives
δ0  ρ  1.5% and ι= [ρ/ δ100 – 1]/100  0.14% per year. The discount rate is thus initially
equal to the benchmark exponential rate but falls to 0.1%/year for a century ahead. Figure 1
and Table 2 report results for the case of generalised discounting and how they compare with
the benchmark case of exponential discounting.
The long-dashed red lines in Fig. 1 indicates the outcome under hyperbolic discounting
if there is no commitment to announced future climate policies. The initial carbon price is
much higher, $92/tC instead of $44/tC, but still rises in line with world GDP at the trend
rate of economic growth of 2% per year. If policymakers can commit future policymakers
to announced plans, indicated by the long-dashed grey lines in Fig. 1, the carbon price still
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Table 3 Ethic, economic, technological and geophysical drivers of optimal climate policies
Carbon price
P0
Sequestration
a0 (%)
Mitigation
m0 (%)
Carbon budget
B (GtC)
Peak warming
PW (°C)
Constant
discounting
(DICE)
44 $/tC 1.5 16.1 784 2.9
Lower
discounting
108 $/tC 3.7 26.5 433 2.2
Higher
inequality
aversion
28 $/tC 1.0 12.7 966 3.2
Slower
economic
growth
55 $/tC 1.9 18.6 629 2.6
Higher damage 87 $/tC 3.0 23.6 509 2.3
Rapid
mitigation
progress
44 $/tC 1.5 20.2 388 2.1
Sequestration
breakthrough
44 $/tC 5.3 19.9 595 2.5
More
sophisticated
carbon cycle
37 $/tC 1.3 14.7 854 3.0
Positive climate
feedback
48 $/tC 1.5 16.4 754 2.8
starts at $92/tC, but rises initially more steeply at a rate 3.3% per year which then tapers off
to a rate of 2% per year as the effect of declining discount rates fades. The declining discount
rate thus makes climate policy more ambitious and especially so if policymakers can commit.
If they renege and carbon prices are re-optimised after say 10 years, the carbon tax would
be marked down by 8% and its growth rate reset to 3.3%. As a comparison, merely reducing
the discount rate and sticking to exponential discounting lowers the initial carbon price, P0,
but leaves the growth rate of the carbon price unchanged.
Hyperbolic discounting without commitment doubles the initial carbon price. This boosts
the share of renewables in the energy mix by half to 24% and doubles sequestration rates to
3%. The start of carbon-free era is brought forward to the second half of this century, the
carbon budget brought down to 488 GtC, and global mean temperature limited to 2.3 °C. If
policymakers were to commit their future selves to their announcements about future climate
policy, emissions and global warming would be reduced further to 436 GtC and 2.2 °C due
the faster rising carbon price. Further comparisons of outcomes under hyperbolic discounting
with and without commitment, exponential discounting and BAU are presented in Table 2.
Under the hyperbolic discounting case without commitment, the discount rate declined
from 1% to 0.1% per year. The top part of Table 3 indicates that setting the constant, expo-
nential discount rate RTI to this lower limit throughout gives even more weight to future
generations and makes climate policy more ambitious. The initial rate increases to $108/tC,
raising abatement and mitigation efforts significantly, limiting carbon emissions to 433 GtC
and temperature increases to 2.2 °C.
123
Simple Rules for Climate Policy and Integrated Assessment
6.2 Intergenerational Inequality Aversion and Affluence of Future Generations
The top part of Table 3 also indicates that higher intergenerational inequality aversion within
our benchmark model with (benchmark) exponential discounting makes climate policy more
lacklustre, given continued economic growth. By increasing IIA from 1.45 to 2, the interest
rate increases from 4.4% to 5.5% per year and consumption of current generations is judged
as more valuable. Less stringent climate policy is enacted. The carbon price falls to $28/tC
and the carbon budget and peak warming increase to 966 GtC and 3.2 °C, respectively.14
Note that the effect of IIA is stronger if the trend rate of economic growth is higher and future
generations are relatively more affluent.
7 Economics: Damages, Economic Growth, and Technical Progress
Table 3 also indicates that doubling the flow damage coefficient parameter (d = $0.038/tC)
doubles the carbon price to $87/tC (or $24/tCO2) and implies a more ambitious climate
policy. This nearly cuts the carbon budget in half to 509 GtC and limits the temperature rise
to 2.3 °C.
7.1 Effects of More Pessimism About Future Economic Growth
A slowdown in global economic growth to g = 1% per year makes future generations less
affluent relative to current generations and thus makes current generations more willing
to make sacrifices to curb future global warming as is evident from the decrease in the
SDR especially if the IIA is high. The initial carbon price increases to $55/tC. There is an
offsetting effect since a lower growth rate of the economy also means a lower growth rate of
damages from global warming, which pushes down the SDR and depresses carbon pricing.
The former effect dominates, since our benchmark calibration has IIA > 1. A lower rate of
economic growth also reduces the growth rate of the carbon price. Table 3 shows that for our
benchmark calibration the initial increase outweighs the slower growth of the optimal carbon
price. As a result, carbon emissions and global warming are curbed by 155 GtC or 0.3 °C.
7.2 Optimistic Scenarios for Technical Progress in Renewables Production
and Sequestration
The DICE calibration used in our benchmark calibration is arguably too pessimistic about
the potential of carbon-free technologies. Figure 2 and the bottom part of Table 3 therefore
show the effects of doubling the speed of technological progress in carbon-free technologies
(rR = 2.5% per year) and of a breakthrough in sequestration technology, lowering the initial
cost of full sequestration to that of renewable energies (A1 = 822 $/tC). Note from Result 1
that these cost variations leave the carbon price unchanged, but do affect the deployment of
renewables and sequestration technologies and thereby the carbon budget and peak warming.
Doubling the speed in renewable innovation, rR, ramps up the adoption rate of renew-
ables in the energy mix which reaches complete decarbonisation 16 years earlier than under
the DICE-calibrated baseline. The carbon budget is reduced to 315 GtC and peak warming
14 Our results for exponential discounting are not that different from using DICE-2013R: a RTI of 0.1% gives
an initial carbon price of $146/tC compared to our $108/tC. Also, raising the IIA to 2 gives a carbon price of
$28/tC just like our back-on-the-envelope IAM.
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curbed to 2.2 °C. A technological breakthrough in sequestration, lowering the cost of decar-
bonisation under complete sequestration to that of full decarbonisation, has little effect on
the statistics reported in Table 3. The cost reduction in sequestration relative to renewables
lowers initial substitution efforts in the energy mix slightly while tripling sequestration. The
cheap availability of sequestration leads to less emissions left unabated but pushes back the
carbon-free era by over a decade. The carbon budget falls by 114 GtC and peak warming to
2.6 °C.
Given a strategy to price carbon, energy mix mitigation and sequestration policies can take
on the two regimes discussed in Sect. 4. While regime I with partial sequestration dominates
in most simulations, regime II with full sequestration occurs under the sequestration break-
through scenario. After a long phase 1 with partial sequestration, full sequestration (phase
2) occurs briefly at the end of century before all fossil fuel is removed from the energy mix
shortly after. Allen (2016) assumes that, while getting rid of all fossil fuel is never cost-
effective, the share of renewables in the energy mix rises steadily with temperature over time
and sequestrated emissions grow exponentially with sequestration continuing indefinitely.
Our framework demonstrates important interactions between both policy instruments: once
all emissions are sequestrated in phase 2, the replacement of fossil fuel by renewables stalls
and rises more slowly as the pressure to limit climate change has been alleviated and relative
cost considerations are the only determinants of the optimal policy mix between sequestration
and substitution. In general, calibrated simulations show that bringing more renewable in the
energy mix is the most important lever to avoid climate change with sequestration lowering
transitions during the transition to the carbon-free era.
8 Geophysics: Worsening of Absorptive Capacity of the Oceans
with Global Warming
Our benchmark model of Sects. 2–5 has a simplified 2-box model of carbon dynamics and
1-box model of temperature dynamics. Typically, the geophysics is modelled in a more
sophisticated way. If we have a K-box model for the carbon cycle, we have
E˙ Pt  β0[1 − a(t , Pt )][1 − m(t , Pt )]γ0e−rγ t Yt ,
E˙T kt  β2k(1 − β0)[1 − a(t , Pt )][1 − m(t , Pt )]γ0e−rγ t Yt − β1k ET kt ,
∑K−1
k1 β2k  1, β2k ≥ 0, k  1, ..K − 1,
˙˜Et 
(
E Pt + (
∑K−1
k1 E
T k
t ) − E˜t
)
/T lag. (3′)
It is straightforward to demonstrate that the optimal carbon price in Result 1 then gener-
alises to
Pt ∼ τY0egt with τ 
(
β0
SDR
+
(∑K
k0
β2k(1 − β0)
SDR + β1k
))(
1
1 + SDR × T lag
)
d , (7′)
For example, the IPCC uses the 4-box model for the carbon dynamics and 2-box model for
the temperature dynamics put forward by Joos et al. (2013). Table 3 shows that the optimal
climate policies are not much affected when we take the 4-box instead of the 2-box model.15
15 We keep our 1-box model of the temperature dynamics. The calibrated coefficients for (3′) with K = 4 are
β0  0.217, β11  0.0025, β12  0.0274, β13  0.2323, β21  0.286, β22  0.360, β23  0.352, and l 
3.2. See also “Appendix 3”.
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With the initial carbon price falling from $43.5 to $36.9/tC, the carbon era lasts slightly longer,
the carbon budget increases by 70 GtC and peak warming by 0.1 °C. Following Millar et al.
(2017), we also introduce positive feedback to the benchmark 2-box model in making the
dissipation coefficients in (3) endogenous and hence representing the rate of absorption of
carbon by the oceans as a decreasing function of global warming.16 Table 3 shows that the
carbon price path and the substitution for renewable energies and sequestration rates are now
slightly higher than either the linear 2-box or 4-box model for the carbon dynamics without
positive feedback loops. This is because policy makers pursue a more ambitious climate
policy to avoid unleashing unwelcome positive feedback loops.
9 Politics: International Climate Deal Stalemates
So far we have assumed that countries in the world jointly determine policies addressing
climate change as a global problem with a common global price of carbon. This presumes
that lump-sum transfers flow from rich to poor countries to make sure that the internationally
cooperative outcome can be sustained by all countries, even those that are poorer. After
thirty years of international negotiations and despite some glimmers of hope at the Paris
2015 summit, the world is still far from an international deal on climate policy. One of the
reasons for this is that rich countries do not want to compensate the poor countries enough
for implementing global climate policy (Helm 2012). It is therefore of interest to compare the
global first-best optimum presented in Result 1 with the outcomes when countries maximise
their own welfare and do not cooperate with each other.17 One can distinguish two non-
cooperative outcomes: a no-commitment outcome (or feedback Nash equilibrium) when
countries cannot commit to future policies and condition their climate policies on the state
of the economy (i.e., the stock of atmospheric carbon) and a commitment outcome (or open-
loop Nash equilibrium) when each country can commit (van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw 1992).
In our case, the two non-cooperative outcomes coincide as the only state variables are the
permanent and transient stocks of carbon in the atmosphere and our rules for the optimal
climate policies are independent of these.18
We attribute at each point in time country-specific flow damages from global warming
to each country i, i.e., di Yi , so that global flow damages sum to
∑N
i1 di Yi  dY where
the weighted average of the flow damage coefficients is d ≡ ∑Ni1 di Yi/Y . In the non-
cooperative case, countries only account for their country-specific damage when setting a
price for carbon.
16 In particular, we model this by assuming that the dissipation rate decreases linearly in cumulative emissions
which themselves can be approximated linearly by time. Our short-cut captures the essence of positive feedback
mechanism of Millar et al. (2017) while still allowing for an analytical solution presented in “Appendix 4”.
17 Our framework limits international movements to energy, whilst there is no further international trade in
goods and services and no international movement of factors of production. This rather radical form of market
incompleteness is not very realistic, but it gives tractable results and has been used before in international
climate economics (Nordhaus, 2010; Hassler and Krusell, 2012).
18 In assuming a balanced growth path in the calculation of the optimal price of carbon, we ignore the dynamics
of capital accumulation as these converge much faster than the carbon cycle. If one were to allow for these
dynamics, the subgame-perfect (or feedback) and open-loop Nash equilibrium outcomes would generally
differ.
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Table 4 Calibration of damages by world regions
Regional damage flow coefficients (as multiples of global coefficient d):
dAfrica = 2.61 d, dEurope = 1.89 d, dUS = 0.3 d, dChina = 0.15 d, dROW = 1.13 d
Regional GDP levels for 2015
GDP0,Africa = 2 T$, GDP0,Europe = 16.8 T$, GDP0,US = 18 T$, GDP0,China = 10.8 T$,
GDP0,ROW = 25.7T$
Regional flow damages per ton of carbon in the atmosphere (di GDPi)
Africa $0.0992/tC, Europe $0.603/tC, US $0.103/tC, China $0.031/tC, ROW $0.552/tC
Result 6: The optimal carbon price for the non-cooperative outcome is
Pit  τi Yi0egi t wi th τi 
(
β0
SDRi
+
1 − β0
SDRi + β1
)(
1
1 + SDRi × T lag
)
di
and SDRi  RT Ii + (I I Ai − 1)gi . (9)
where the fraction of renewable energies in the energy mix and the fraction of fossil fuel that
is sequestrated are given by (1) and (2), respectively.
Due to international free-rider problems, non-cooperative carbon prices are a factor N
lower than under international policy cooperation if countries are equal in size and other
respects. Poorer countries tend to suffer more from global warming (high di) but still their
desired carbon price is typically lower due to their GDP being much lower. To the extent that
poor countries are catching up and have higher growth rates, their desired carbon prices will
be lower still (provided their IIA exceeds unity). The transition to the carbon-free era will
take longer under non-cooperation, especially if GDP levels and growth rates are distributed
unevenly.19 Given lower carbon prices mitigation and sequestration rates are also lower
without an international climate deal, especially in poorer countries.
To illustrate, we use the regional damage coefficients and initial regional GDP levels
(from the World Bank data base) presented in Table 4. This disaggregation follows the
RICE-2010 IAM (Nordhaus 2010) and uses the ensuing regional flow damage coefficients
(Hassler and Krusell 2012). In RICE a 2.5% increase in global mean temperature causes an
output-weighted loss of 1.5%, but in Africa and Europe this figure is 2.61 and 1.89 times as
much, respectively, whilst in China and the US these ratios are only 0.15 and 0.3, respectively.
The damage coefficients for global warming are thus high in Africa and in Europe compared
to the US and especially China. Looking at regional flow damages per ton of carbon in the
atmosphere (the third row in Table 4), we see that they are highest in Europa (due to both
a high GDP and a high damage coefficient) and the rest of the world (ROW) but lowest
in Africa (due to a low GDP and despite a high damage coefficient) and China (due its
relatively low damage coefficient). This suggests that Europe has a much stronger interest
in an international climate deal than Africa or China and also more the than the US. The
choice of regions is naturally arbitrary but it serves to illustrate the biases in national climate
policies when an international climate deal has not been achieved.
19 Note that country-specific T i results from G0e−rF Ti +θ−1a A1e−rATi aθaiTi +(1−aiTi )PiTi  H0+H1e
−rR Ti
and the corresponding carbon budget Bi from cumulative use during time 0 and Ti . Global transition time is
the maximum T i and the global carbon budget
∑
i Bi .
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Fig. 3 Non-cooperative regional climate policies. Key Failure to reach a global climate deal increases emissions.
Each country tries to avoid its own damages but ignores those inflicted on others. Differences in exposure to
climate change and income levels lead to varying degrees of ambition in climate policy. Europe with high
levels of exposure and income decarbonises first; China with low exposure and income takes longest to drive
emissions to zero. (Color figure online)
Figure 3 and Table 5 presents global emissions and regional climate policy when countries
or regional blocks cooperate with each other and when they do not. We assume that cost and
social welfare parameters are the same in all regions of the world.20 Due to international
free-rider problems self-interested climate policy without an international agreement is sig-
nificantly less ambitious than the first-best outcome discussed in the previous sections with
lower shares of renewables in the energy mix and sequestration ratios, later transitions to
full sequestration and a fully carbon-free energy mix, and consequently higher emissions in
total for the global economy. The average carbon price without a climate deal starts at only
$11/tC, only a quarter of what it would be under international policy cooperation. Global
warming peaks thus at 4.0 °C instead of 2.9 °C and the carbon budget is 1352 GtC instead
of 784 GtC. These poor outcomes under non-cooperation are likely to be even worse when
countries in each regional bloc do not cooperate.
Without international transfers from rich to poor countries, the poorest regions in the
global economy have little appetite to implement ambitious climate policies. This is why
Africa and to a lesser extent China have relatively low carbon prices and thus relatively low
abatement and mitigation ratios. The US has, of course, the highest level of GDP, but its
optimal non-cooperative carbon tax is nevertheless very low as the damage coefficient for
the US is relatively small. Due to a very low damage coefficient and a low level of GDP, China
has the lowest price of carbon. Consequently, these two regions take the longest to reduce
emissions to zero (see left panel in Fig. 3). Given their high initial carbon prices, Europe and
the rest of the world are the quickest in phasing out fossil fuels. Due to the absence of regional
differences in economic and technological growth rates, Africa and the US are following the
same mitigation and abatement paths. A more disaggregated analysis would account for such
differences which, due to lower technological capabilities in Africa than in the US, would
lead to lower efforts to replace fossil fuel by renewables in Africa and strengthen ambition
in the US.
20 We only disaggregate damages and output and keep technological coefficients uniform across regions.
A more detailed analysis would have to account for differentials in growth rates and technological progress
across regions.
123
F. van der Ploeg, A. Rezai
Table 5 Regional climate policy and global carbon budgets
Region Carbon price
P0
Abatement
a0 (%)
Mitigation
m0 (%)
Carbon budget
B (GtC)
Africa 3.1 $/tC 0.1 3.8 44
China 1.0 $/tC 0.0 1.9 253
Europe 18.9 $/tC 0.6 10.2 257
US 3.2 $/tC 0.1 3.8 393
Rest of the World (RoW) 17.4 $/tC 0.6 9.7 405
Global cooperative 44 $/tC 1.5 16.1 784
Global non-cooperative 11 $/tC 0.4 7.1 1352
Business as usual 0 $/tC 0 0 1778
Key Regional climate policy is significantly less ambitious than under global policy coordination. Aggregating
the regional policy responses (upper part of the table) to global averages (lower part), gives a carbon price
of a quarter of the globally optimal, a carbon budget of 1352 GtC, and peak warming of 4.0 °C which
compares favourably with 4.9 °C under business-as-usual but is far above the 2.9 °C under international policy
coordination and cooperation
10 Conclusions
The central questions of climate policy are how much and how fast to replace fossil fuel
with renewable energies in the energy mix; how much and how fast to sequestrate emissions
from using fossil fuel; and how to set the initial and future prices of carbon both under
non-cooperative and cooperative decision making in the global economy to achieve these
goals. Much of the academic debate in climate change economics has focused on the dif-
ference of various estimates for the optimal carbon price, perhaps most prominently in the
debate between Nordhaus and Stern about discount rates. We present a simple framework
with which these questions can be meaningfully addressed without resorting to one of the
large-scale numerical Integrated Assessment Models. Our back-of-the-envelope Integrated
Assessment Model provides simple rules for the optimal price of carbon and for optimal
share of renewables in the energy mix and sequestration policies and allows translation of
these into climate objectives such as carbon budgets and peak warming. Our framework cal-
culates the welfare-maximising carbon price but also pays attention to the dynamics of the
technological capabilities available at different points of time. The carbon price and relative
cost competitiveness determine the adoption and diffusion rate of carbon-free technologies.
We see our analysis as complementary to more detailed, often numerical, simulations as we
focus on the key drivers and ignore potential cross-interactions between capital accumulation
and climate policy. Our aim was to develop a simple and easy-to-understand framework that
brings together various aspects of climate change economics and can be used for teaching
and for communication to policy makers to illustrate four key messages.
First, the optimal price of carbon and the ambition of climate policy are crucially driven
by ethical considerations such as the discount rate and relative intergenerational inequality
aversion on how to trade off the welfare of future and current generations. In a DICE-based
calibration with a constant rate of time preference of 1.5% per year the current carbon price
is $44/tC (or $12/tCO2) which increases to $146/tC if one adopts the discount rate of the
Stern Review. We have shown how the standard framework with exponential discounting can
be extended to allow for high discount rates at short horizons and much lower discount rates
at long horizons by adopting a hyperbolic discounting approach. This hybrid case, which is
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our preferred estimate, respects the criticism of Nordhaus and Stern of each other’s approach
and significantly boosts the optimal price of carbon to $92/tC (or $25/tCO2) and the speed at
which fossil fuel is removed from the energy mix and emissions are sequestered to limit peak
warming to 2.3 °C. Our framework takes into account that future policymakers might not
want to respect the past climate pledges; our solution does not assume commitment. If future
policymakers could commit to announcements about future policies, climate policy is more
ambitious but time-inconsistent. The ability to commit, however, has minor implications for
the carbon budget and peak warming.
Second, the qualitative nature of climate policy depends on how the economic and global
warming costs of renewable and fossil energies and sequestration develop with time. If
technical progress in renewable energy production is fast compared with that in developing
sequestration technology, the economy replaces all fossil fuel by renewable energies (100%
mitigation) before all fossil fuel is fully sequestrated. If technological progress in sequestra-
tion is relatively fast or if there is a breakthrough in sequestration technology, there will be
an intermediate regime where all fossil fuel is fully sequestered before the economy finally
transitions to using only renewable energies. During this intermediate phase of full sequestra-
tion, the urgency of climate policy recedes and the share of renewables in energy generation
stalls. Due to current cost conditions and the ugly dynamics of NIMBY politics and running
out of holes to put sequestrated carbon in, this second regime appears unlikely.
Third, as far as the geophysics is concerned, using a 4-box instead of a 2-box model of
the carbon does not affect the optimal carbon price much. But allowing for the capacity of
the oceans to absorb CO2 to diminish as oceans heat up, pushes up the optimal carbon price
somewhat in order to avoid such positive feedback loops being set in motion.
Fourth, lack of international climate deals implies that carbon pricing and thus climate
policies are nationally determined and lacklustre with the result that the necessary transition
to the carbon-free era is much delayed and peak warming increases by an additional 1.1 °C.
Part of the problem is failure of the rich countries to compensate the poor countries adequately
for implementing an ambitious carbon price. This is why it is crucial to start with a club of
countries who implement ambitious climate policies and generate mechanisms to get as many
countries to join. A relatively low penalty trade tariff on countries outside the club of 5%,
waived once they join, can lead to large and stable coalitions of countries and overcome
free-riding in international climate policy (Nordhaus 2015).
It is straightforward to extend these back-of-the-envelope calculations to allow for more
convex damages, stock-dependent fossil fuel extraction costs, sequestration costs that increase
with the stock of sequestrated carbon, and learning by doing in renewables production (see
“Appendix 5”). Since there is mounting evidence that climate policy shapes technological
progress and research & development and that directed technical change and path dependence
matters (e.g., Acemoglu et al. 2016; Aghion et al. 2016), it is important to allow for such
endogenous feedbacks.
Our analysis solely considered climate-related damages to the economy without consider-
ing other non-climate implications of carbon-based processes. According to some estimates,
such costs to health and well-being are of the same magnitude as the climate-related damages
and might be important drivers of climate policy in certain regions (West et al. 2012; Šcˇasný,
et al. 2015). E.g., while our regional analysis suggests that China should adopt few efforts
to eliminate fossil fuel from the energy mix in the absence of a climate deal, non-climate
co-benefits have been the key motivation for decarbonisation of industrial processes and fast
ramping-up of renewable energy sources in this region. Our simple rules could be easily
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extended to include such additional costs of fossil fuels by adjusting the damage coefficients
and thus the carbon price upwards.
Our simple framework may give too cautious answers as more convex global warming
damages, damages to the growth rate of the economy and the risk of a cascade of catastrophic
events which are more likely to occur at higher temperatures lead to a more aggressive climate
policy (Dietz and Stern 2015; Rezai and van der Ploeg 2016; Lemoine and Traeger 2016; Cai
et al. 2016), but can be extended to allow for such factors. If future climate policy turns out
to be not ambitious enough and takes too long to materialise, there will be no other option
than to attempt to curb negative carbon emissions via bio-energy with CCS, direct air capture
or enhanced weathering as these forms of “negative emissions” may be needed to bridge the
gap between cuts to meet global mitigation targets and current emissions trends (e.g., Fuss,
et al. 2014).
Finally, as can be seen from Table 2, the usual DICE damages lead to peak global warming
higher than 2 °C (unless one uses the very low discount rate of the Stern Review or the very
low long-run discount rates that prevail under hyperbolic discounting with commitment). This
contradicts the aims of the 2016 Paris Agreement to limit global warming to 2 °C and to aim
to for peak warming of 1.5 °C. The Paris caps on peak global warming are, on the one hand,
scientifically motivated as higher temperatures would lead to intolerably high risks of tipping
points, and, on the other hand, politically motivated to keep small island states that are at risk
of flooding aboard. One approach is to revise the damages from global warming upwards to
ensure that peak global warming remains below 2 °C or 1.5 °C. The integrated assessment
literature, in contrast, ignores damages from global warming altogether and minimises the
present discounted value of costs subject to the constraint that peak warming cannot exceed
2 °C or 1.5 °C or alternatively that cumulative carbon emissions stay within the safe carbon
budget corresponding to the cap on global warming. The resulting price of carbon must rise
more rapidly to reflect that carbon gets scarcer as the carbon budget approaches exhaustion.
In fact, the carbon price follows a Hotelling path and thus rises more rapidly at a rate equal
to the rate of interest instead of the rate of economic growth (e.g., Nordhaus 1982; Tol 2013;
Bauer et al. 2015).21 One way of integrating the welfare maximisation approach based on
estimates of global warming and the cost minimisation approach based on a cap on global
warming or cumulative emissions is to maximise welfare net of global warming subject to
the cap on peak warming or cumulative emissions. This gives a cost-minimising price of
carbon that is higher than under unconstrained welfare maximization and that grows at a rate
somewhere in between the interest rate and the rate of economic growth (van der Ploeg 2018;
Dietz and Venmans 2018).
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Appendix 1: Proof of Results 1–3
Global welfare is
∫ ∞
0 DtU (Ct )dt , where U (Ct )  C
1−I I A
t
1−I I A (for I I A 
 1, U (Ct )  ln(Ct )
else) is time separable and has constant intergenerational inequality aversion and D(t) the dis-
count rate at time t with D′(t) ≤ 0. Most economic analyses assume exponential discounting,
i.e.Dt  e−ρt with a constant rate of time impatience RT I  ρ. Using small letters to denote
fractions of output before damages (e.g., ct ≡ Ct/Yt ), climate policy {at , mt }∞t0 is chosen
to maximise global welfare,
∫ ∞
0
c1−I I At
1−I I A Dt e
g(1−I I A)t dt , subject to the resource constraint
1 − d Et  ct +
[(
G0e−rF t + 1θa A1e
−rAt aθat
)
(1 − mt ) + H0mt + 1θm m
θm
t H1e−rR t
]
γ0e−rγ t .
The social consumption discount rate given by C DR  RT I + I I A × g and the growth-
corrected interest rate by SDR  RT I + (I I A − 1)g  C DR − g.
The Hamiltonian for this problem with r equal to the SDR is
H ≡ 1
1 − I I A
[
1 − d E˜t −
(
H0mt +
1
θm
m
θm
t H1e−rR t
)
γ0e
−rγ t
−
(
G0e−rF t +
1
θa
A1e−rAt aθat
)
(1 − mt )γ0e−rγ t
]1−I I A
+ λ˜(E Pt + ETt − E˜t )/T lag
+ λPβ0(1 − at )(1 − mt )γ0e−rγ t Y0egt + λT
(
(1 − β0)(1 − at )(1 − mt )γ0e−rγ t Y0egt − β1 ETt
)
.
where λPt , λT t and λ˜t are the co-state variables for the dynamics of E Pt , ETt and E˜t at time
t, respectively. Using Et  E Pt + ETt , the first-order optimality conditions are:
∂H
∂at
 −c−I I At A1e−rAt aθa−1t (1 − mt )γ0e−rγ t − [β0λPt + (1 − β0)λT t ](1 − mt )γ0e−rγ t Y0egt  0,
(10)
∂H
∂mt
 c−I I At
[(
G0e−rF t +
1
θa
A1e−rAt aθat
)
− mθm−1t H1e−rR t − H0
]
γ0e
−rγ t
− [β0λPt + (1 − β0)λT t ](1 − at )γ0e−rγ t Y0egt  0, (11)
rλPt − λ˙Pt  ∂H
∂E Pt
 λ˜t/T lag, (12)
rλT t − λ˙T t  ∂H
∂ETt
 λ˜t/T lag − β1λT t , (13)
r λ˜t − ˙˜λt  −dc−I I At (Y0egt )−1 − λ˜t/T lag. (14)
Upon defining Pt ≡ −cI I At [β0λPt + (1 − β0)λT t ]Y0egt , (10) and (11) yield (2) and
(3). For purposes of calculating our simple rule for the optimal price of carbon only, we
suppose that along a steady-growth path, c is approximately constant. In our baseline cal-
ibrations presented in Fig. 1 and Table 2, c varies by at most 3% over time. We note that
for IIA  0, our equilibrium expressions for climate policy are exact. Hence, (14) gives
λ˜t Y0egt ∼ − 1r+1/T lag dc−I I A and (12) and (13) give −λPt Y0egt cI I A  1r
(
1
1+r×T lag
)
d and
−λT t Y0egt cI I A  1r+β1 11+r×T lag d. Hence, τ 
(
β0
r
+ 1−β0
r+β1
)
1
1+r×T lag d , so Pt  τY0egt is
given by (7). The transition time condition is that the marginal cost of the last ton of fossil
fuel equals the marginal cost of renewables at full decarbonisation, H0 + mθm−1T H1e−rR T 
G0e−rF T + 1θa A1e
−rAT aθaT + (1 − aT )PT with mT  1.
In case of full sequestration takes place before the energy mix has fully eliminated
replaced fossil fuel by renewables, aT  1 for T ′ ≤ t < T , the transition time for
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full sequestration T ′ satisfies A1e−rAT
′  τY0egT ′ and for full decarbonisation from
G0e−rF T + 1θA A1e
−rAT aθa−1T  H0 + H1e−rR T with aT  1, so T ′  1rA+g ln
(
A1
τY0
)
< T
and T from G0e−rF T + 1θa A1e
−rAT  H0 + H1e−rR T . 
Appendix 2: Pricing Carbon Under Hyperbolic Discounting
With hyperbolic discounting the Hamiltonian for this problem is
HH yperbolic ≡
(
1
1 + ιt
)−ρ/ι
e(1−I I A)gt
1 − I I A
×
[
1 − d E˜t −
(
G0e−rF t +
1
θa
A1e−rAt aθat
)
(1 − mt )γ0e−rγ t −
(
H0mt +
1
θm
m
θm
t H1e−rR t
)
γ0e
−rγ t
]1−I I A
+ λPβ0(1 − at )(1 − mt )γ0e−rγ t Y0egt + λT
{
(1 − β0)(1 − at )(1 − mt )γ0e−rγ t Y0egt − β1 ETt
}
+ λ˜(E Pt + ETt − E˜t )/T lag.
where λPt , λT t and λ˜t are the (discounted) co-states for the dynamics of E Pt , ETt and E˜t at
time t, respectively. Using Et  E Pt + ETt , the first-order optimality conditions are:
∂HH yperbolic
∂at
 −c−I I At A1e−rAt aθa−1t (1 − mt )γ0e−rγ t − [β0λPt + (1 − β0)λT t ](1 − mt )γ0e−rγ t Y0egt  0,
(15)
∂HH yperbolic
∂mt
 c−I I At
[(
G0e−rF t +
1
θa
A1e−rAt aθat
)
− mθm−1t H1e−rR t − H0
]
γ0e
−rγ t
− [β0λPt + (1 − β0)λT t ](1 − at )γ0e−rγ t Y0egt  0, (16)
−λ˙Pt  ∂H
H yperbolic
∂E Pt
 λ˜t/T lag, (17)
−λ˙T t  ∂H
H yperbolic
∂ETt
 λ˜t/T lag − β1λT t , (18)
−˙˜λt  ∂H
H yperbolic
∂ E˜t
 −dc−I I At e−g(I I A−1)t (1 + ιt)−ρ/ι − λ˜t/T lag. (19)
Again, for purposes of deriving our simple rule for the optimal price of carbon
only, we suppose that along a steady growth path, c is approximately constant or
that IIA  0. Hence, (19) gives λ˜t  −c−I I Ad ι−1(1 + ιt)1−ρ/ιeω Eρ˜/ι (ωt ) where
ωt 
(
T lag−1 − (I I A − 1)g)(ι−1 + t) and En(x) 
∫ ∞
1
e−xt
tn dt is the generalised exponen-
tial integral function. Equations (17) and (18) give λPt  −c−I I Ad
( 1
1+ιt
)ρ/a
e
g(I I A−1)
ι (ι−1 +
t)
{
Eρ/ι (g(I I A −1)(ι−1 + t))− el−1
(
ι−1+t
)
Eρ/ι (
[
g(I I A −1) + T lag−1](ι−1 + t))
}
and λT t 
−c−I I Ad( 11+ιt
)ρ/ι
e
g(I I A−1)
ι
(
ι−1+t
)
1−T lag×β1 ×
{
eβ1
(
a−1+t
)
Eρ/ι
([g(I I A − 1) + β1](ι−1 + t)
) −
el
−1(ι−1+t
)
Eρ/a
([
g(I I A − 1) + T lag−1](ι−1 + t))
}
.
We achieve these results and avoid potential problems of multiplicity by solving the model
for a finite horizon H and taking the limit H → ∞.
Defining Pt ≡ −cI I At [β0λPt + (1 − β0)λT t ]Y0egt as before, our simple rule for the opti-
mal price of carbon becomes (8). Taking the limit ι → 0, gives (7).
To obtain the feedback Nash equilibrium without commitment, we have to take into
account the resetting of carbon prices in each period. In our simple framework, the only
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time-varying determinant of the carbon price is exogenously growing GDP. We can, therefore,
simply evaluate the carbon price of (8) at time t  0 and substitute Y (t) for Y0 to obtain (8′).
In a more general model, it is much more difficult to calculate the feedback or subgame-
perfect Nash equilibrium as one would allow for capital stock dynamics and more general
equilibrium interactions of the economic and climate system. This is even so for the rela-
tively straight-forward case of the special assumption of logarithmic utility, Cobb-Douglas
production function, 100% depreciation of capital each period, exponential damages to TFP
and a linear carbon cycle and used by Golosov et al. (2014) and quasi-hyperbolic discounting
in discrete time which has exponential discounting for all future periods and an additional
parameter to bias up the welfare weight of the present by more than all future periods (Ger-
lagh and Liski 2018). The analysis is more complicated with more general functional forms
and generalised hyperbolic discounting (Iverson and Karp 2018).
Appendix 3: Further Details on the Benchmark Calibration
The economic drivers of climate policy consist of initial fossil fuel and renewable energy
costs, G0, H0, and H1, which are calibrated to give current energy cost shares of 7% of GDP
and the additional cost of 5.6% of GDP for full decarbonisation following DICE. The rate
of directed technical change of rate of 1.3% per year is chosen to match the cost of 1.6% of
GDP for full decarbonisation in 100 years, again based on DICE. The cost of carbon-based
energy increases by 0.1% per year to capture resource scarcity and match baseline emissions
scenarios of the EMF-22 (Nordhaus 2015). The cost of full sequestration is calibrated to
initial 20% of GDP, falls at the rate of non-carbon technologies, and decreases to 5.7% of
GDP in 100 years. Given that there is large uncertainty around the technological prospects
of CCS and other abatement technologies, we conduct sensitivity analyses around them in
Sect. 7. Initial GDP is 73 T$ and energy use per unit of GDP of 0.14 GtC/T$ is calibrated
to match current yearly emissions of 10 GtC. We keep emissions intensity itself constant as
we capture the adoptions of carbon-free technologies endogenously in at and mt . The flow
damage of the stock of carbon in the atmosphere of 0.019 $/tC which equals 0.5% of GDP
at current levels of atmospheric carbon.
The calibration of the climate module to the model of Joos et al. (2013) follows except the
calibration of the lag structure which deviates from the original model. Here we use the finding
of Caldeira and Ricke (2014) who find that maximum peak warming occurs in the median
after 10 years in the model of Joos et al. (2013). Together with the fact current and committed
warming currently are 1 °C and 1.3 °C, respectively, we have T lag  −10/ ln[4.33(1 − x)],
with x the percentage of peak warming occurring after 10 years. We set x  99% and Tlag
 3.2 years.
Appendix 4: Pricing carbon under declining absorption rates
With a time-dependent absorption rate the Hamiltonian with climate feedback for this problem
is
Hc. f . ≡ 1
1 − I I A
[
1 − d E˜t −
(
H0mt +
1
θm
m
θm
t H1e−rR t
)
γ0e
−rγ t
−
(
G0e−rF t +
1
θa
A1e−rAt aθat
)
(1 − mt )γ0e−rγ t
]1−I I A
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+ λ˜(E Pt + ETt − E˜t )/T lag + λPβ0(1 − at )(1 − mt )γ0e−rγ t Y0egt
+ λT
(
(1 − β0)(1 − at )(1 − mt )γ0e−rγ t Y0egt − β1(1 − α t)ETt
)
.
where λPt , λT t and λ˜t are the (discounted) co-states for the dynamics of E Pt , ETt and E˜t at
time t, respectively. Using Et  E Pt + ETt , the first-order optimality conditions are:
∂Hc. f .
∂at
 −c−I I At A1e−rAt aθa−1t (1 − mt )γ0e−rγ t − [β0λPt + (1 − β0)λT t ](1 − mt )γ0e−rγ t Y0egt  0,
(20)
∂Hc. f .
∂mt
 c−I I At
[(
G0e−rF t +
1
θa
A1e−rAt aθat
)
− mθm−1t H1e−rR t − H0
]
γ0e
−rγ t
− [β0λPt + (1 − β0)λT t ](1 − at )γ0e−rγ t Y0egt  0, (21)
−λ˙Pt  ∂H
c. f .
∂E Pt
 λ˜t/T lag, (22)
−λ˙T t  ∂H
c. f .
∂ETt
 λ˜t/T lag − β1(1 − α t)λT t , (23)
−˙˜λt  ∂H
c. f .
∂ E˜t
 −dc−I I At e−g(I I A−1)t − λ˜t/T lag. (24)
Again, for purposes of deriving our simple rule for the optimal price of carbon only, we
suppose that along a steady growth path, c is approximately constant or that IIA  0. Hence,
(24) gives λ˜t Y0egt ∼ − 1r+1/T lag dc−I I A. Equations (17) and (18) give λPt Y0egt cI I A 
− 1
r
(
1
1+r×T lag
)
d and λT t Y0egt cI I A  d1+r×T lag 2√2αβ1 Φ
[
− r+β1(1−αt)√2αβ1
]
with Φ[x] 
e−x2
∫ x
0 e
y2 dy the Dawson integral of x. Defining Pt ≡ −cI I At [β0λPt + (1 − β0)λT t ]Y0egt ,
the simple rule for the optimal price of carbon with declining absorption can be evaluated
parametrically. at and mt follow from (20) and (21) and are identical to the expressions given
in (1) and (2).
Appendix 5: Fossil Fuel Extraction Costs That Rise as Reserves Fall,
Sequestration Costs That Rise and Renewable Costs That Fall as Cumu-
lative Use Rises
Here we consider the case when fossil fuel extraction get more costly if reserves fall, so costs
increase with cumulative fossil fuel use: G(St )  G0e−rF t
[
1 + e S0−StS0
]
, with e > 0 and S0
and St denoting initial fossil fuel reserves at time zero and t, respectively. Fossil fuel reserves
decline according to the depletion equation S˙  −(1−m)γ Y with S0 given. Cumulative fossil
fuel use is S0 – ST . We also let costs for sequestration rise as more carbon is sequestrated and
reservoir capacity has shrunk for geological or NIMBY reasons, so cost of sequestration can
be specified as 1
θa
A1e−rAt aθat V
β2
t , with β2 > 0, where the stock of sequestrated carbon evolves
according to V˙  aF  a(1−m)γ Y . We let renewable energy production gets cheaper with
learning by doing, one can specify the cost of mitigation as 1
θm
m
θm
t H1e−rR t B
−β3
t with β3
> 0, where the stock of accumulated knowledge about renewable energy production evolves
according to B˙  R  mγ Y . We then get the following generalised rules for climate policy.
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Result A1: Our simple rule for the optimal carbon price is given by (7) in Result 1. The time
paths for the optimal sequestration and share of renewables in the energy mix are
at 
(
τt − θV t
A1V β2t
)εa
erAεa t , 0 ≤ t < min[T , T ′], (25)
mt 
(
G0e−rF t [1 + e(1 − St/S0)] + 1θa A0e−rAt a
θa
t V
β2
t − H0 + Xt
H1e−rR t B−β3t
)εm
,
0 ≤ t < T and m(t)  1, t ≥ T , (26)
where Xt ≡ τt + θSt + θBt − (τt − θV t )at and θS(t), θV (t) and θB(t) are the scarcity value of
in situ fossil fuel, the social cost of sequestrating an additional unit of carbon, and the social
benefit of learning by doing in renewable energy production at time t, respectively.
Proof The Hamiltonian function is
Hextended ≡ 1
1 − I I A c
1−I I A
t +λPtβ0(1 − at )(1 − mt )γ0e−rγ t + λT t
(
(1 − β0)(1 − at )(1 − mt )γ0e−rγ t − β1 ETt
)
+ λ˜t (Et − E˜t )/T lag + [−λSt (1 − mt ) + λV t at (1 − mt ) + λBt mt ]γ0e−rγ t Y0egt ,
where λ˜, λS , λV and λB are the co-states for E˜ , S, V and B respectively, and
ct  1 − d E˜t −
(
G0e−rF t
[
1 + e
S0 − St
S0
]
+
1
θa
A0e−rAt aθat V
β2
t
)
(1 − mt )γ0e−rγ t − H0mtγ0e−rγ t
− 1
θm
m
θm
t H1e−rR t B
−β3
t γ0e
−rγ t . The first-order optimality conditions are (12), (13), (14),
∂Hextended
∂at
 −c−I I At A0e−rAt aθa−1t V β2t (1 − mt )γ0e−rγ t
− [β0λPt + (1 − β0)λT t ](1 − mt )γ0e−rγ t + λV t (1 − mt )γ0e−rγ t Y0egt  0,
(27)
∂Hextended
∂mt
 c−I I At γ0e−rγ t
(
G0e−rF t
[
1 + e
S0 − St
S0
]
+
1
θa
A0e−rAt aθat V
β2
t − mθm−1t
H1e−rR t B−β3t − H0 +Pt (1 − at )) − (λV a − λS − λB )γ0e−rγ t Y0egt  0,
(28)
rλSt − λ˙St  ∂H
extended
∂St
 c−I I At G0e−rF t
e
S0
(1 − mt )γ0e−rγ t , (29)
rλV t − λ˙V t  ∂H
extended
∂Vt
 −β2
θa
A0e−rAt aθat V
β2−1
t (1 − mt )γ0e−rγ t cI I At , (30)
rλBt − λ˙Bt  ∂H
extended
∂ Bt
 β3
θm
m
θm
t H1e−rR t B
−β3−1
t γ0e
−rγ t cI I At . (31)
Defining Pt  τY0egt and τt ≡ −cI I At [β0λPt + (1 − β0)λT t ]Y0egt as in proof of Result
1, we get (7) from (12), (13) and (14). With θSt ≡ cI I At λSt Y0egt , θV t ≡ −cI I At λV t Y0egt and
θBt ≡ cI I At λBt Y0egt , we see that Eq. (23) yields
(32)
G0e−rF t
[
1 + e
S0 − St
S0
]
+
1
θa
A0e−rAt aθat V (t)β2
− mθm−1t H1e−rR t B−β3t − H0  − τ (1 − at ) − (θV a + θS + θB).
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Equation (32) can be rewritten as (26). Similarly, Eq. (15) gives
A0e−rAt aθa−1t V
β2
t τ − θV (33)
which gives (25). Equations (29)–(31) give the dynamics of the scarcity rent on fossil fuel
(RFF), the social cost of sequestration (SCS) and the social benefit of learning by doing
(SBL):
θ˙St  (r − g)θSt − G0e−rF t eS0 (1 − mt )γ0e
−rγ t Y0egt , (34)
θ˙V t  rθV t − β2
θa
A0e−rAt aθat V
β2−1
t (1 − mt )γ0e−rγ t Y0egt , (35)
θ˙Bt  (r − g)θBt − β3
θm
m
θm
t H0e−rR t B
−β3−1
t γ0e
−rγ t Y0egt . (36)

This extended back-of-the-envelope IAM needs to solve (34)–(36) together (25)–(26),
the depletion equation S˙  −(1 − m)γ0e−rγ t Y0egt , the sequestration sink cost equation
V˙  a(1 − m)γ0e−rγ t Y0egt , and the learning-by-doing equation B˙  mγ0e−rγ t Y0egt as a
two-point-boundary value problem with predetermined values for S(0), V (0) and B(0).
Without the ability to capture the effects of scarcity to deposit sequestered carbon in and
the benefits of renewable innovation, there are three market failures now, which need three
corrections. The first one is to price carbon at the social cost of carbon (SCC), which is the
present discounted value of all future marginal damages from burning one unit of fossil fuel
today. The second one is to subsidise renewable energy use at the social benefit of learning
by doing in renewable energy production (SBL), which from (36) amounts to the present
discounted value of all future reductions in the cost of renewable energy production from
producing one unit of renewable energy today. The third one is a tax on CCS to allow for
the increasing costs of sequestration as more reservoirs are used up. This tax is set to the
social cost of sequestration (SCS), which from (35) equals the present value of all future
increases in sequestration costs resulting from sequestrating one unit of carbon today. In
contrast, the scarcity rent of fossil fuel (RFF) is from (34) the present discounted value of
all future increases in extraction costs resulting from depleting one unit of fossil fuel today.
The RFF is internalised by fossil producers and requires no government action.
It follows from Eq. (26) that a bigger share of renewable energy is used if the scarcity rent
on fossil fuel, the social benefit of learning in renewable energy production, and, to the extent
that it is used, the social cost of sequestration is high. In other words, the share of renewables
in the energy mix increases in RFF+SCC+SBL and, to the extent that sequestration takes
place, decreases in SCC-SCS. As in Eq. (1) of Result 1, it also increases in the costs of
extracting fossil fuel and sequestrating carbon emissions. Equation (25) extends Eq. (2) and
shows that the fraction of carbon that is sequestrated increases in the difference between the
price of carbon and the social cost of sequestration, i.e., it increases in SCC–SCS.
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